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Summary 
One of the ways to improve human rights protection is the building of “national human rights 
institutions” (further NHRIs), that is quasi-governmental, non-judicial bodies, the functions of 
which are specifically defined in terms of protection and promotion of human rights. Since the 
early 1990s, these institutions have expanded considerably around the world. In the Czech 
Republic no NHRI has yet been established. This paper argues that, while the long-term goal 
should be setting up a new independent, statutory human rights body as requested by UN 
international standards, the interim solution consists in adjusting and strengthening the 
existing model of non-judicial mechanisms to promote and protect human rights, 
complemented by flanking measures, such as encouraging human rights research and 
developing effective communication networks. 
 
Introduction 
International standards, both at the UN and regional levels, represented, respectively, by the 
UN General Assembly Resolution 48/134 (1993), commonly known as the Paris Principles 
and by the Council of Europe Recommendation No R (97) 14 on the Establishment of 
Independent National Human Rights Institutions request that states establish independent non-
judicial human rights bodies. Evidence shows that democratic states adhering to international 
norms take these standards seriously. Latest examples are the establishment of German 
Institute for Human Rights in March 2001 and the ongoing transformation of the Norwegian 
Centre of Human Rights into a national institution. Recently, the UN treaty monitoring 
bodies, the Human Rights Committee (2001)1, and the Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (2002)2 urged the Czech Government that it should adopt measures to 
establish effective independent monitoring mechanisms for the implementation of the 
respective covenant rights and should create an NHRI.  
 
Domestically, several years after the establishment of the triplet of entities involved in human 
rights protection, the Human Rights Commissioner (1998), the Human Rights Council (1999) 
and the Ombudsman (2000), there is a need for an initial evaluation of their performance. 
Being a product of domestic developments and not of UN involvement, as is the case of some 
NHRIs in other countries (e.g. in neighbouring Slovakia), these institutions diverge from the 
UN concept of an NHRI. Nonetheless, they fulfil many of the functions assigned to NHRIs. 
The functional overlapping between the UN-sponsored NHRIs and the new Czech non-
judicial bodies involved, in various ways, in human rights protection calls for an examination 
of the functioning of these new institutions from the perspective of international standards 
developed in relation to NHRIs. If improvements of institutional arrangements are needed, as 
indicated by the UN bodies, should they take the form of setting up a new NHRI or should a 
different type of reorganization be initiated?  
                                                 
1 Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee: Czech Republic. UN CCPR/CO/72/CZE. 27 
August 2001. 
2 Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Czech Republic. 
E/C.12/1 Add.76. 5 June 2002. 
 
National Human Rights Institutions 
While the notion of a national human rights institution dates back to 1946, it was only the 
global wave of democratisation after the end of the Cold War that brought about the 
unprecedented growth of these institutions. At present, there are more than a hundred NHRIs 
around the world. A decisive breakthrough for both the normative basis and the significance 
of the NHRIs was a workshop in Paris in October 1991, where a common charter for NHRIs 
emerged. The workshop was followed by the adoption of the UN General Assembly 
Resolution 48/134 on 20 December 1993, which defines the Principles Relating to the Status 
and Functioning of National Institutions for Protection and Promotion of Human Rights, 
commonly referred to as the Paris Principles.  
 
The Paris Principles define competences and responsibilities, composition and guarantees of 
independence and methods of operation of NHRIs. An NHRI shall promote and protect 
human rights. It shall be given as broad mandate as possible, set out in legislation or in the 
constitution. It shall fulfil a range of responsibilities in relation to the Government, the 
Parliament or other competent bodies. For instance, it shall advise these bodies and submit 
opinions, recommendations, proposals and reports on any matter concerning human rights or 
any situation of violation of human rights. It shall prepare reports on the national situation, 
drawing the Government's attention to human rights violations, ensure the harmonisation of 
national laws and practices with international instruments, encourage ratification of 
international treaties and contribute to reports that states submit to UN bodies. It shall also 
increase public awareness of human rights through information, education and the media. A 
national institution may be authorized to consider individual complaints. The central 
characteristic of an NHRI is its independence. An NHRI is a body which is neither executive 
nor judicial nor legislative; it is located somewhere between the sphere of government and 
that of civil society. 
 
The Paris Principles began to outline a more ambitious role for the NHRIs. NHRIs are also 
gradually forming a new category of international actors. Most scholars distinguish various 
types of the NHRIs, such as advisory committees (e.g. French Human Rights Commission), 
commissions (e.g. Human Rights Commission in Canada), hybrid ombudsmen (Poland, 
Slovenia) and human rights institutes, with specific focus on research (Nordic countries). 
Existing models of the NHRIs differ immensely and it is simply impossible to reduce the 
number of existing institutions to a single type. In spite of a boom of studies focusing on the 
performance of NHRIs, there are no apparent conclusions regarding the nexus between 
distinct institutional types and performance. Neither is it clear, if ideally, a NHRI should be a 
single body. Current practice of the UN organs concerning the accreditation of NHRI 
indicates that different bodies could perform different functions of NHRIs, so long as the 
functions are covered in some way. This leads to the conclusion that the concept of the NHRI 
is not yet fully evolved. Some critical scholars argue that UN succeeded in diffusing the 
NHRIs because they tap into a cross section of more basic state interests. The broad-gauged 
manner in which the UN framed NHRIs may contribute to the fact that even hypocritical 
states that violate human rights norms establish NHRIs to improve their international images 
(Cardenas, 2003:35-38). In addition, critical scholars point out that suggestions regarding the 
reforms of particular NHRI made by the UN bodies are characterised by a breadth and 
generality that calls their usefulness into serious question (Gallagher, 2000: 208-209). Still 
more interestingly, some students of NHRIs argue that some of the NHRIs made little impact 
although they apply Paris Principles, while others are widely respected though they appear 
compromised or constitutionally defective. 
 
The Non-Judicial Bodies of Human Rights Protection 
After 1989, very speedily, complex, modern constitutional provisions and laws to protect 
human rights were adopted in the Czech Republic. New institutions to enforce compliance 
with them, such as an independent judiciary and the Constitutional Court, were established. 
For most conservatives and liberals, who formed governments from 1992 until 1998, the 
human rights mission of the Velvet Revolution was thus accomplished. This understanding 
clashed with another vision based on the Charter 77 legacy of broad societal responsibility for 
human rights protection. The victory of the Social Democrats in 1998 election opened the way 
for a new human rights programme. In 1999-2000, new and significant developments have 
occurred, including setting-up of the new, non-judicial mechanisms involved in the human 
rights protection. These were the appointment of a Government Human Rights Commissioner 
in 1998, the creation of a Government Human Rights Council in 1999, and the establishment 
of an Ombudsman office in 2000. The institutional landscape will soon be further altered by 
implementation of the new EU anti-discrimination legislation, which requests the 
establishment or designation of an independent equality body. 
 
Currently, the non-judicial protection apparatus is composed of (1) the classical parliamentary 
ombudsman, with a limited human rights mandate, (2) a high-ranking government official 
responsible for the human rights area and (3) the advisory council to the Government. The 
Human Rights Council is composed of representatives of the executive, at the deputy minister 
level, and representatives of the civil sector (i.e. representatives of NGOs and independent 
experts). The responsibilities of the Commissioner, who is the head of the Council, and of the 
Council, are not clearly detached, but overlap. They consist in four major tasks (1) monitoring 
domestic observance of commitments under major human rights treaties; (2) preparing 
strategies and concrete measures for the Government, either at its own initiative or at the 
Government's request; (3) expressing opinions on measures proposed by the Government and 
governmental departments or on other measures concerning human rights; and (4) 
participating, jointly with governmental departments and NGOs, in drafting reports for the 
treaty monitoring bodies. In practice, the Commissioner and the Council’s Secretariat fulfill 
most of these tasks. 
 
The existing institutional arrangements diverge from the UN concept of an NHRI, in 
particular since the Commissioner and the Council are bodies subordinated to the 
Government. Still they evidently fulfil many of the functions assigned to NHRIs. If we look at 
the existing triplet of non-judicial institutions as a single institutional structure and compare it 
with the requirements of the Paris Principles, we see that most of the functions are actually 
covered by one or more bodies. (For details, see the table in appendix). Yet, some manifest 
gaps and shortcomings exist. Obviously, there are many institutional defects stemming from 
the fact that both the Commissioner and the Council lack any reasonable degree of 
independence. Moreover, the defects also concern other issues. For instance, there is a lack of 
relations to Parliament. The requirement that the NHRI assists in the formulation of 
programmes for teaching of and research into human rights and takes part in their execution in 
schools, universities and professional circles is not effectively carried out by any of the 
existing institutions either. 
 
Towards Establishing a National Human Rights Institution 
Both the international concern as well as internal reasons, in particular weaknesses and 
defects in the structure and functioning of the Human Rights Commissioner and the Human 
Right Council, substantiate suggesting changes, including fundamental institutional reforms. 
The question is whether such reforms should take the form of setting up a new NHRI or of 
other arrangements. Basic policy options that we suggest for further examination are devised 
on the combination of three elements: the ideal normative goals, projection of existing trends 
and feasibility considerations. The basic three alternatives thus determined are: 
?a) establishing of an independent statutory NHRI; 
?b) extending the mandate of Ombudsman to cover human rights issues; 
?c) adjusting and strengthening the decentralised, functional model of non-judicial 
mechanisms to protect and promote human rights 
 
a) Establishing of an Independent Statutory NHRI 
 
Establishing a new statutory body would be the most straightforward response to the 
international concerns related to the lack of independent non-judicial mechanisms for human 
rights protection and promotion. Ideally, a new NHRI should be established by an Act of 
Parliament, should be accountable to Parliament and its budget should be determined by 
Parliament as well. A new statutory body, whose financial and institutional independence will 
be thus reasonably secured, could be composed of a small number of full-time 
commissioners. 
 
As regards the election or appointment of the commissioners, either the model for the election 
of the Ombudsman (i.e. election by Parliament from a group of candidates proposed by the 
president and the Senate) or, preferably, that for the appointment of judges of the 
Constitutional Court (appointment by the President with the consent of Senate) can be used. 
The chief commissioner may appoint commissioners to cover specific rights areas or to ensure 
a good coverage of key issues. (This model turned out to function very well with the 
Ombudsman and his deputy.) In keeping with the procedure followed by the Ombudsman and 
many NHRIs in the world, the commission should have the authority to appoint its own staff.  
 
As regards the remit and the responsibilities of the commission, these have to be construed 
carefully, bearing in mind that the commission would appear in an already cluttered 
institutional landscape (which is likely to encompass not only the ombudsman institution, but 
possibly also a new equality body). The competencies of the commission should be broad-
based, covering the full spectrum of human rights. Existing non-judicial bodies however, 
should retain specific functions, in particular complaint handling. Consequently, core 
functions of the new institution should consist in independent monitoring, research and 
educational activities. To secure the needed communication with other bodies and input from 
civil society, the establishment of a consultative body to the commission should be 
considered. 
 
Benefits 
Clearly, the establishment of a new independent statutory body would allow best for a 
comprehensive revision and remedying of all existing shortcomings and gaps. It would bring 
the human rights agenda into a new place within society, visualising its unique nature as an 
area of common concern and responsibility. The independence and position of the institution 
between the sphere of government and that of civil society would allow the body to function 
as a vehicle for collaboration with national as well as international institutions, thus bridging 
the existing division of human rights into their domestic and foreign aspects. 
 
Disadvantages 
The creation of a new NHRI requests adequate funding, including the high set up costs. This 
clashes with the current government top priorities, namely cutting the budget deficit and 
reducing numbers of officials paid from public budgets. Political will to pass such legislation 
and to ensure resources currently do not exist. Moreover, if presented as a proposal for 
immediate reform, it would coincide with the establishment of a new equality body. The 
ongoing difficulties with the establishment of the equality body also show that it would be 
difficult to gain reasonable support for the proposal from within the state administration. 
Extensive awareness-raising work would also be needed to overwhelm popular feelings that 
documents and institutions do not bring any improvement to the situation of individuals.  
 
With regard to the low political feasibility, this option could only be reasonably promoted as 
a strategic, long-term goal.  
 
b) Extending the Mandate of Ombudsman to Cover Human Rights Issues 
 
As the institution of ombudsman turned out to be a great success, it might seem to be natural 
to try to write more human rights issues into his mandate or in other words, to shift his 
position from a classical ombudsman to one of a hybrid ombudsman and gradually to 
transform the Ombudsman into the full NHRI. This idea would not be a new one. The original 
intention, supported by the civic sector in early 1990s, was to have a human rights 
ombudsman.  
 
More importantly, we can observe that, in reality, this tendency is currently gaining new 
ground. Although prompted by different motives, the ombudsman's mandate is very likely to 
be extended in the near future by assigning him the responsibilities of the control organ for 
the limitations of liberty and those of the equality body. Merging the two institutions, the 
Ombudsman and the NHRI, into one body would not be unique either, as it is happening in 
other countries as well. 
 
Benefits 
The combined functions of the national institution and the ombudsman offer a strong 
protection of the individual. This solution would enable savings of administrative and 
financial cost, if compared to option a). Recent experiences also show that extension of the 
mandate of an existing institution is preferred by the administration to the creation of a new 
body, if institutional reforms turn out to be indispensable. 
 
Disadvantages 
There are, however, several weighty arguments against modifying the remit of the 
Ombudsman to cover the full range of human rights issues. Entrusting the Ombudsman with a 
cluster of diverse responsibilities and tasks, stemming from the Paris Principles, would, in 
combination with his current mandate result in an incoherent, overbroad, and diverse 
jurisdiction of a single body. If his powers to investigate remained limited to 
maladministration by public bodies (and possibly also cases involving discrimination), while 
the reporting and other obligations were to cover a broadly defined human rights area, the 
means in different areas of his jurisdiction would be imbalanced. Combining two distinct 
roles - that of enhancing good governance and that of promoting human rights - is also likely 
to have an unintended detrimental effect on the societal understanding of human rights.  
 
The extension of the Ombudsman’s mandate may be not seen as ideal from the point of view 
of the development of a pluralistic society. In a pluralistic society, diversity of opinions and 
institutions and their mutual dialog are vehicles of progress. The single giant ombudsman 
institution does not necessarily promote such development. Ombudsmen as single member 
institutions also often fall short of the formal institutional input from civil society. 
 
Extending the Ombudsman's jurisdiction to cover human rights issues is only seemingly a 
simple, cost free solution. In reality, the disadvantages may outweigh potential benefits.  
 
c) Adjusting and Strengthening the Decentralised, Functional Model of Non-Judicial 
Mechanisms to Protect and Promote Human Rights 
 
The proposed solution of strengthening and improving the decentralised, functional model of 
non-judicial mechanism to protect and promote human rights is based on three suppositions. 
These are the assumptions that (1) several bodies can carry out various functions assigned to a 
NHRI and that (2) distinct tasks require differing actual levels of independence. Institutional 
defects do not in practice present a central problem with regard to carrying out a number of 
functions ascribed to the NHRI, if such functions are carried out in a pluralistic society which 
contains a vigorous civil sector, free media and an even distribution of power and influence 
among competing political parties. Finally (3), the option assumes that the functional model 
already exists, even if in a nascent form.  
 
We have demonstrated that if we look at the existing triplet of non-judicial institutions (the 
Human Rights Commissioner, the Human Rights Council and the Ombudsman) as a single 
institutional structure and compare it with the requirements of the Paris Principles; we see 
that most of the functions are actually covered by one or more bodies. The third option for 
reform consists in designing a series of reform steps, concerning the non statutory bodies, the 
Human Rights Commissioner and the Human Rights Council, which will bring them as far as 
possible into line with the spirit of international standards. The main line of changes concerns 
the Human Rights Council, which should be adjusted to the maximum extent possible to the 
model of the advisory committee, following the French National Consultative Commission on 
Human Rights. 
 
Benefits 
Evidently, a major principal comparative advantage of the proposed solution stems from its 
conservative nature. Unlike option a), outlined above, it does not imply a need of waiting for a 
change on the political scene and it does not necessitate a long preparatory phase. It would 
allow an immediate launching of the reform scenario. Further, with limited exceptions, the 
proposed transformations would not request legislative changes. The proposed reforms do not 
alter the role of other institutions and thus we can assume that the resistance from within the 
state administration would be low. Finally, it is also important that the reforms would not 
prevent any further future developments, either toward the a) or b) options. 
 
Disadvantages 
Clearly, the reform proposals as outlined above have inherent limits. For instance, they can 
never transform the existing institutions so profoundly as to bring them fully into line with the 
standards stemming from the Paris Principles as regards independence. It is not guaranteed 
that the reformed Human Rights Council will qualify as an NHRI and could thus benefit from 
being a part of the global network of NHRIs. Some of the proposals also touch upon the 
current role of the Human Rights Commissioner, shifting the symbolic role of “the human 
rights defender” to the Council. Therefore, the Commissioners conviction that proposed 
reforms are necessary and beneficial will play a key role. 
 
Well-tailored adjustments and strengthening of existing non-statutory bodies could bring 
substantial progress with limited resources. At the same time, this is also the only option that 
is politically feasible at present. 
 
Conclusions and Recommendations 
 
Assessing the benefits and the disadvantages of the above three possible arrangements, the 
recommendation is that while the preferable long-term goal should be the establishment of an 
independent, statutory human rights commission a), the interim solution consists in adjusting 
and improving the functional model of non-judicial mechanisms to promote human rights c). 
The two policy options are not exclusive, but should be implemented in sequences whereby 
the incremental changes with long-term perspective c) should pave the way for a more radical 
policy reform a). Such a reform would require a longer preparatory phase, the mobilisation of 
political support, and would only be feasible after the framework political conditions have 
been met. Therefore, a set of policy recommendations aimed at improving the existing 
mechanisms, in particular the tandem of the Human Rights Commissioner and the Human 
Rights Council is proposed: 
 
Recommendations: 
 
The Commissioner and the Council 
 
?The Commissioner and the Council should clarify their respective roles and relations 
vis a vis each other 
 
The Commissioner as a government official responsible for human rights should re-formulate 
his tasks in terms of co-coordinating activities within the Executive, while the Council should 
play an advisory role to the Government. This necessary conceptual separation would amount 
to a number of small, yet significant changes. For instance, when the Commissioner compiles 
reports to treaty monitoring bodies, or prepares annual human rights reports, and the Council 
contributes to such documents, it should make sure that its position is clearly spelled out. The 
clarification of the respective roles shall be incorporated in the revised statute of the Council. 
 
?The Commissioner and the Council should make all efforts to gain more public visibility 
and authority 
 
The Council should publish its proposals extensively before they are submitted to the 
Government. In this regard, a set of improvements in communication with the public and 
special audiences, such as journalists, is indispensable. The top item on the list is establishing 
an adequate web page.  
 
?The Commissioner and the Council shall prepare an Action Plan on Human Rights 
 
In order to ensure openness as regards the efforts of government authorities, the World 
Conference on Human Rights in Vienna in 1993 recommended that all countries draw up 
action plans on human rights. The Czech Republic has not followed the recommendation. 
Nonetheless, an Action Plan could bring benefits. It could serve as a communication 
instrument, not only with relevant government departments, but also with the Parliament. It 
may be an important tool in efforts to create a more consistent and coordinated policy in the 
field of human rights. Moreover, it can secure a reasonable degree of integrity of human rights 
policies, if there is a change of a Government. The Action Plan, if elaborated jointly with the 
Foreign Ministry, may also be a tool for ensuring, that the Government pursues a holistic 
policy on human rights both at home and abroad. Finally, the preparation of the Action Plan 
would be helpful for defining special priority areas and may encourage the needed strategic 
thinking in this field. 
 
The Human Rights Council 
 
?The Council should be reformed as regards its compositions to respect the criteria of 
minimum independence, impartiality and neutrality of its members 
 
The statute of the Council should be changed to withdraw full membership with voting 
rights away from the government officials. The representatives of the concerned ministries 
shall participate with the right of discussion only.  
 
?The Council should be reformed towards gaining a reasonable degree of autonomy 
 
The autonomy of the Council should be enhanced by appointing members (with right of 
vote) for a fixed period or for the duration of the term of their office. The current situation, 
when the term of the Office of the Council expires with the term of the Office of the 
Government is highly unsatisfactory. Ideally, the Council should also try to gain a 
statutory basis, which does not necessarily involve adopting a new law. The role model 
here would be that of a governmental Legislative Council, the role of which is entrenched 
in the Competence Law. 
 
?The Council should establish relations to the Parliament 
 
The Council should establish at least informal links to both chambers of the Parliament, 
preferably by including the representatives of the relevant Parliamentary committees as 
full members or, alternatively, in the position of permanent guests.  
 
?The Council shall use all efforts to establish contacts on the international level 
 
While it may be unrealistic to try to gain the status of an NHRI and thus be involved in the 
global network of national institutions, the Council shall try to establish bilateral relations 
with the most relevant NHRIs, first of all within the European group. Following the 
French model, Czech experts sitting in international human rights bodies shall be 
members of the Council in their personal capacity.  
 
The Human Rights Commissioner  
 
?The Commissioner shall broaden and revitalize his contacts with civil society and create 
a functioning communication network 
 
At present, cooperation of the Commissioner with the civil society sector is mainly 
through the Human Rights Council and its committees. Nonetheless, these interactions 
take place within the rigid hierarchical structure of the Council and its working groups. 
As a result, members of all the working groups actually never meet. They are not 
informed about what is happening outside their group either. Therefore, it is proposed 
that at least once upon a time a more informal gathering of human rights advocates 
and researchers is organised. 
 
?The Commissioner shall establish networks of international contacts to similar 
governmental institutions abroad 
 
This task is not easy, as unlike in the case of ombudsmen or NHRIs there is no 
existing network, a part of which the Commissioner would become. Yet, the lack of 
international contacts on the working level is not only a barrier for his more effective 
work, e.g. with regard to the lack of exchange of current information on topical issues. 
It also pushes him into an insular position on the domestic scene. This problem 
becomes more acute as the Czech Republic becomes a member of the EU and some 
aspects of human rights issues necessarily gain new European and transnational 
dimensions. 
 
?The Commissioner shall launch a human rights research support scheme and work 
toward establishing an institutional basis for the development of the human rights 
research 
 
One of the most serious problems is the lack of research into human rights. It has a 
detrimental effect on how efficiently the Council and the Commissioner carry out their 
assigned tasks. Therefore, the promotion of human rights research is critical. While 
establishment of a research centre as an independent entity would be an ideal solution, 
other more feasible options, such as creating a human rights centre within the 
Parliamentary Institute, at a university or the Academy of Sciences should also be 
discussed. The starting point here is launching a scheme supporting human rights 
research. The grant scheme may be established following the model of the existing 
research grant scheme operated by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
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